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Technical Barriers to Trade:
A Case Study of Phytosanitary Barriers
and U.S.-Japanese  Apple Trade
Linda Calvin and Barry Krissoff
Concern  about the use of technical barriers  as restrictions to trade has increased
since the World Trade Organization Agreement on Agriculture. In this analysis, we
quantify the phytosanitary barriers  to U.S. apple exports  to Japan by calculating
tariff-rate  equivalents.  We  examine  the trade  and  welfare  impacts  of removing
phytosanitary barriers and tariffs under two assumptions regarding transmission
of the bacterial disease fire blight: first, that transmission via commercial fruit is not
possible, and second, that it can occur. The disease losses required to eliminate the
gains  to trade  are estimated  to be  much larger than those  experienced  in  other
countries.
Key words:  apples, cost-benefit analysis, Japan, phytosanitary barriers, tariff-rate
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Introduction
When the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture was negotiated
during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, many feared
that reducing traditional supports to the agriculture sector would lead governments to
place  more  reliance  on  technical  barriers  (TBs)-particularly  sanitary  and  phyto-
sanitary  barriers-to  protect  producers.  TBs  are  defined  as  import  standards  or
regulations that reflect a country's concern and valuation for safety, health, food quality,
and the environment (Roberts and DeRemer; Hillman). TBs include sanitary and phyto-
sanitary regulatory measures related to food safety and animal and plant health; food
standards  of definition,  measurement,  and  quality;  and  environmental  or  natural
resource  conservation measures. To date, TBs generally have not been quantified,  and
therefore cannot be easily compared with other trade barriers.
The Agreement  on the Application  of Sanitary and Phytosanitary  Measures  (SPS
Agreement),  also negotiated  during the Uruguay  Round,  allows  sanitary and phyto-
sanitary regulatory measures to protect plant, animal, and human health. Each member
country determines its own level of  protection, and adoption of a zero-risk tolerance level
is allowed.  The regulatory measures  used to achieve  a particular level of protection
require  a sound  scientific  base,  although  the  standards  for assessing the  scientific
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criteria are unclear and debate is frequently contentious (Thilmany and Barrett). There
is often uncertainty regarding the level of disease and pest risk associated with trade
which can provide either the basis of a legitimate concern  or a convenient  excuse to
justify  a  trade  barrier.  This  scientific  uncertainty,  particularly  in  cases  of  low-
probability  but  high-consequence  events,  can  lead  to  an  extremely  conservative
approach to setting phytosanitary barriers and, as a result, potential welfare gains to
trade may be lost (Bigsby).
The SPS Agreement is rooted more in the risk-assessment tradition, which focuses
only on losses  to producers, than it is in the economic cost-benefit  analysis  tradition
(Roberts; James and Anderson). Economists consider welfare analysis that evaluates the
costs and benefits of a TB on producers, consumers, and net social welfare as a critical
first step of any policy assessment.
A TB can function solely as a means to provide economic rents to domestic producers,
as does a tariff, although TBs provide no revenue to the government. Unlike a tariff, a
TB may increase national social welfare if it rectifies a failure of the market to incor-
porate important product externalities in the product price.  These attributes  can be
important to consumers and producers. For example, if a country is free of a damaging
pest, imports from a country with that pest may be regulated on the grounds that the
market price does not reflect the potential costs to society of reduced yields or export
opportunities,  increased production expenses, or eradication programs.
If the sole intent of a phytosanitary TB is to protect domestic producers from import
competition, relaxing the TB would improve consumer welfare, reduce producer welfare,
and yield a net gain in social welfare.  Conceptually,  both consumers  and producers
potentially could gain if  consumers compensate producers for the removal of an artificial
TB.  If a phytosanitary  TB  protects  an industry from the  costs associated  with  the
introduction  of a foreign plant disease  or pest, relaxing the TB  would further reduce
producer welfare. If the disease or pest has a serious impact on yield or production costs
in the  new environment,  the  additional  reduction  in producer  welfare  could  be  so
significant as to eliminate any consumer welfare gains and justify the TB on economic
as  well  as scientific  grounds.  Alternatively,  if producer  losses  are  relatively  small,
removing the TB could still increase net welfare, and the TB would not be justified on
an economic basis.
The growing literature on TBs in agriculture falls into three categories. First, there
is a nascent literature identifying TBs for different commodities and countries (Roberts
and DeRemer; Petrey and Johnson; and Ndayisenga and Kinsey). Second, economists
have developed several methods for measuring TBs. Baldwin surveys the literature on
the measurement  of TBs and identifies a few empirical examples for agriculture. The
third strand of the literature focuses on the welfare effects of TBs. A number of papers
have addressed the theory  of welfare  effects  of TBs  (Josling;  Sumner and  Lee; and
Thilmany and Barrett). A small and growing literature of empirical examples illustrates
the welfare impacts of altering TBs on U.S. imports of avocados (Romano; Orden and
Romano), U.S. imports of beef (Paarlberg and Lee), and Australian imports of bananas
(James and Anderson).
In this study, we investigate the role of TBs in the highly contentious U.S.-Japanese
apple trade  dispute. The United States is a major apple exporter, but Japan imposes
rigorous phytosanitary TBs on U.S. imports to control against transmission of disease
and pests. The article begins with a discussion  of U.S. and Japanese  apple markets,
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phytosanitary TBs, and trade. In the following section, we present an analytical model
for measuring TB tariff-rate equivalents  for Fuji apples and the welfare effects asso-
ciated  with removing  trade  barriers.  Next,  the  empirical results  are  reported.  We
estimate  TB tariff-rate  equivalents,  and the  trade  and  welfare  effects  in Japan of
removing  tariff rates  and  TBs. Japan's phytosanitary  TBs  are predicated  upon the
potential introduction of fire blight, codling moth, and apple maggot. We focus on the
bacterial disease fire blight, which lies at the center of long-running scientific  debate
regarding  the level  of inspection  needed  to protect  against transmission.  The  U.S.
Department  of Agriculture's  (USDA's) Animal and  Plant Health Inspection  Service
(APHIS) contends there is virtually no risk of transmission of fire blight on commercial
fruit. Evaluation of the scientific evidence is beyond the scope of this research. Instead,
we examine the welfare effects of removing the TB under the assumption that fire blight
cannot be transmitted,  and  find  substantial  gains  to trade.  Alternatively,  we then
assume fire blight can be transmitted, and investigate how large a disease loss would
be required to eliminate the gains from trade. The article concludes with comments on
the value of this type of research and a review of assumptions that may influence the
empirical results.
U.S.-Japanese Apple Markets and Trade
The United States is one  of the world's largest fresh apple exporters.  In the 1996/97
marketing year (August 1996 through July 1997), 24% of U.S. fresh apples were export-
ed, with Washington State apples accounting for an estimated 86% of the total. While
many varieties  of apples are produced in the United States, Red and Golden Delicious
remain the most common, accounting for an estimated 56% of the 1996 U.S. crop. The
Fuji apple is a relatively new variety in the United States and production is concen-
trated in the western states. While Fuji apples represented only 5% of the 1996 apple
crop,  production increased from 90,758 metric tons in 1993, to 241,794 metric tons in
1996. Fuji production in the year 2005 is forecast to be 460,000 metric tons (O'Rourke).
This  is  an  important  structural  change  in the  industry  as  producers  respond  to
opportunities  in the fresh  export market  and to changing  consumer preferences  for
sweeter apples.
Most countries accept the U.S. systems approach to disease and pest management for
apple exports  as an adequate  precaution  to protect their domestic industries.  Fresh
produce  can harbor diseases  and pests  which could  survive shipment  and endanger
production  in  other  countries.  The  systems  approach  uses  a  combination  of  risk-
mitigating measures which individually and cumulatively reduce the risk of the target
diseases  or pests to an insignificant level. This approach is employed in cases where a
country or region cannot qualify as a disease-free or pest-free zone, or the postharvest
treatment damages the commodity or leaves unacceptable chemical residues (Roberts
and Orden). For example, the systems approach for Washington State apples consists
of good commercial  production practices, grading  and sorting that further  eliminate
fruit with any disease or pest infestation  or damage,  and visual inspection.  Systems
approaches  can vary by state or region.
Japan is a major apple producer, famous for its high-quality fruit, but largely isolated
from world apple markets. Both imports and exports account for 1%  or less of Japanese
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Table 1. U.S. and Japanese Apple Production, Trade, and Consumption Pat-
terns (1994/95-1996/97  marketing years)
United States  Japan
Description  1994/95  1995/96  1996/97  1994/95  1995/96  1996/97
Productiona (MT)  5,139,836  4,712,824  4,673,815  989,300  963,300  899,200
Fresh imports (MT)  130,149  173,913  169,318  8,900  1,089  338
Fresh exports (MT)  692,511  552,129  688,697  1,800  2,506  3,625
Processing (MT)  2,252,176  2,062,393  1,814,415  182,400  163,000  135,000
Consumption  (MT)  2,325,298  2,272,215  2,340,021  814,000  798,883  760,913
Import share of consumption (%)  6  8  7  1  <  1  <1
U.S. share of imports (%)  NA  NA  NA  95  77  31
Sources:  USDA/Economic  Research Service; USDA/Foreign Agricultural  Service  1996, 1997.
Notes:  The marketing year for the U.S. is August-July, and for Japan is July-June; MT denotes metric tons, and
NA signifies not applicable.
"Production indicates utilized commercial production in the U.S., and total commercial and noncommercial produc-
tion in Japan.
consumption. (See table 1 for an overview of U.S. and Japanese apple production, trade,
and consumption patterns.) In 1996/97, Japan imported apples from New Zealand, the
United States, the Republic of Korea, and Nepal. Fuji apples totaled 52% of domestic
Japanese apple production in 1996/97, and Red Delicious apples accounted for about 2%
of production (USDA/Foreign Agricultural Service  1997).
In 1994, Japan lifted its long-standing ban on imports of U.S. apples and authorized
imports of Red and Golden Delicious apples from Washington and Oregon under rigor-
ous phytosanitary  requirements.  This decision  followed the  1993 threat by the U.S.
Trade  Representative  to  impose  general trade  sanctions  over the  apple  issue.  The
Japanese phytosanitary requirements  on apple imports are commonly viewed as the
most restrictive of any country, short of an outright ban.1 Japan is concerned with the
spread  of fire  blight,  codling  moth,  and apple  maggot.  Only  U.S.  Red  and  Golden
Delicious apples are allowed into Japan because tests of the effectiveness of quarantine
treatments have been completed for these two varieties.  Cold treatment and methyl
bromide fumigation quarantine treatments control codling moth and apple maggot. Here
we address only fire blight. The inspections for fire blight are the most costly portion of
the apple export program.
Fire  Blight
Fire blight is a bacterial disease that affects apple trees and other plants in the family
Rosaceae. Fire blight is indigenous to the eastern United States and is now widespread
throughout the country. A search of world scientific literature indicates virtually no risk,
and no confirmed cases, of fire blight transmission by commercial fruit (van der Zwet
1Other prominent examples  of countries that completely ban imports of U.S. fresh apples on phytosanitary grounds are
Korea and Australia. Chile  opened its market to U.S. apples in late 1997.
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and Keil). Fruit from a diseased tree would be deformed and would not meet commercial
quality standards.  It is difficult to prove the negative case that it is not possible  to
transmit. Scientists believe the disease has more potential to spread through trade in
propagative plant material.
Fire blight is currently widespread in North America, New Zealand, Europe, Egypt,
and western Asia (van der Zwet). Trade in propagative plant material is suspected in
transmission to New Zealand, England, and Egypt. Environmental conditions, such as
warm and humid weather at bloom time, can promote an outbreak. The disease  can
spread under these conditions if infectious material is in the air. Affected branches are
pruned to prevent the spread of the disease. In a severe case, a tree might be removed.
Although it is virtually impossible to eradicate  fire blight, because the bacterium has
many cultivated and wild hosts, standard commercial orchard operations such as use
of prediction  models,  spraying, and pruning are usually adequate  to prevent  serious
outbreaks  of the disease. Yield may be  affected, but increases  in per acre production
costs are relatively small. Individual orchard owners deal with the problem if  it occurs,
but there is no government intervention in control activities for fire blight in the United
States.
It is difficult to estimate actual losses due to fire blight. Incidence of the disease in a
given location depends on many factors in addition to climate, particularly the varieties
of apple trees in the area as well as the presence of other susceptible hosts (pear trees
are more susceptible to fire blight damage). In the United States, serious outbreaks  of
fire blight are rare. In 1991, Michigan production losses due to a severe outbreak were
estimated at almost 4% of the value of production (Smith and Lattimore).
In Washington State, there are fire blight outbreaks almost every year, but serious
problems occur in only a small percentage of orchards about one year in five (Smith).
The worst outbreak of fire blight in Washington in decades occurred in the spring of
1988, but had little impact on overall production. Of course, it is difficult to compare
potential fire blight outbreaks in other countries to those in the United States, where
the apple industry has had decades to adjust both location and varieties to cope with
this disease. Washington State is cooler and drier than many other U.S. production
areas, a factor that reduces  the problem  of fire blight,  and the Red Delicious  apple
grown in Washington is also highly resistant to the disease. Fuji apples, however, are
less resistant to fire blight (van der Zwet and Beer).
Japan claims its apple production areas to be free of fire blight, thereby justifying its
rigorous regulations regarding the disease. Nevertheless, fire blight was reported in that
country in 1903, and up though the 1930s (Roberts et al.). In addition, a closely related
bacterial shoot blight of Asian pear, caused by a slightly different form of the bacterium,
was reported recently (Beer et al.).
For import purposes, Japan requires a chlorine  dip as one of several precautions
against fire blight.  Chlorine  dip  is an inexpensive  procedure  and  does not  damage
apples. U.S. growers who wish to export apples to Japan also must register their acreage
in advance for the Japanese protocol, and must comply with all phytosanitary require-
ments. An orchard shipping apples to Japan must be inspected three times each season
by representatives of APHIS. The inspections must occur at bloom time, when the fruit
is three centimeters  in size, and just prior to harvest when a Japanese inspector also
must be  present.  The Japanese  inspector  examines  every tree  in an orchard  block
registered  for the export program  for evidence  of fire blight. Further, the area must
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have a 500-meter buffer zone with no pear trees or other natural fire blight hosts. This
buffer zone  also is inspected.  If fire blight is found in the orchard  or buffer zone,  all
apples in that orchard block are banned from export to Japan for the season. Growers
registered for the export program pay the inspection costs. The  certification must be
renewed  annually.  This is a risky protocol because  there is no  guarantee,  after  all
expenses are incurred, that a grower will have any apples of the appropriate  size and
quality for the Japanese market.
Estimates put the likelihood of an outbreak of fire blight, based on the level of recent
trade in commercial  apples  under  the current  export protocol  for Japan,  to be  one
outbreak in every  38,462 years.  In  comparison,  based  on  only the  standard  export
procedures used for trade with most countries, the likelihood is one outbreak in 11,364
years (Roberts et al.).
U.S.  -Japanese  Apple Trade
During the 1994/95 season (the first year of apple trade with Japan), U.S. exports of Red
and Golden Delicious apples to Japan totaled 8,497 metric tons. Growers enrolled 2,406
acres  in the export  program  in the first  season  (with 2,508  acres  in buffer zones)
(Scarlett). Since then, exports have declined drastically, and no apple growers registered
their acreage for the 1997/98 crop year. Limited demand for Red and Golden Delicious
apples in Japan, a high tariff, and the costly and risky phytosanitary requirements have
led to less profit in exporting to Japan than originally anticipated (Krissoff, Calvin, and
Gray).
The United States currently is attempting  to expand Japanese  import approval to
other apple varieties. Japan bans imports of a variety until tests for quarantine treat-
ment for that variety have been completed,  even if tests for other varieties of apples
have been successful. New Zealand, where tests were completed earlier, already exports
six varieties of apples to Japan. The United States contends that each variety of apple
should  not  have  to  be  tested  individually  for  the  efficacy  of  the  treatment  for  a
quarantine insect because a quarantine treatment to kill an insect on one variety of
apple is equally effective on another variety of apple. Different varieties, however, may
have varying susceptibility to disease. Following talks in June 1997, the United States
and Japan failed to reach an agreement, and the United States called for a WTO dispute
panel to resolve the issue. In October 1998, the WTO found that Japan's variety testing
procedure violates its WTO obligations.
An Analytical Framework
Tariffs and TBs alter relative prices between world and national markets. To compare
the effects of the two types of policies, we estimate a tariff-rate equivalent to measure
the magnitude of the TBs. The price wedge approach is used to measure the TB tariff-
rate equivalent. The price wedge is the difference between the domestic Japanese price,
P, and the price of similar U.S. apples delivered  to Japan, WP, a proxy for the world
price [see figure l(a)]. The price wedge is divided into the known ad valorem tariff rate
(r) and the TB tariff-rate equivalent (TTB),  which is the residual. With this method, the
TB tariff-rate equivalent is the tariff rate that would restrict trade to the same level
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as the TB. While straightforward,  this methodology requires the strong assumption
that no other significant factors contribute  to the price wedge between two countries
(Baldwin).
Another  alternative  for estimating  the  impact  of TBs  is measuring  actual  costs
involved in preparing  a product to comply with phytosanitary requirements  in other
countries.  Even if the phytosanitary standards for Fuji apples were made equivalent
to those for Red and Golden Delicious apples, the regulatory cost for exports still would
be  difficult to  estimate,  since  the  protocol targets  specific inspection  practices  in a
particular  growing area as  well as quarantine treatments  for the final product to be
shipped.
To measure the trade and welfare impacts of reducing trade barriers, we  develop a
simple partial-equilibrium,  two-equation  modeling system that endogenously  deter-
mines the TB tariff-rate  equivalent  and the level  of trade.  This system is shown by
equations (1) and (2):
(1)  P  < WP(1  + T + TTB)  if  T  = 0,
P  = WP(1  + T +  TB)  ifT>0;
(2)  T  = D(P) - S(P),
where T is imports from all sources, D is consumer demand, S  is domestic supply, P is
domestic wholesale price, WP is the world price adjusted for freight and insurance to the
Japanese market, r is the ad valorem tariff rate, and  cTB is the ad valorem TB tariff-rate
equivalent. Here, we assume that the WP reflects costs for the standard exported apple,
not the  costs  of the  specific  TB  which  regulates  only  that small  portion  of  apples
intended for the Japanese market.
We  solve equation (1) for the unknown  TTB.  If there is trade, equation  (1)  is a strict
equality. Without trade, equation (1) is an inequality, and TTB is a lower-bound estimate
of the barrier. The TB may be just sufficient to cut off trade, it may be larger, or it may
be a complete ban. In all three cases, the observable impact on trade is identical,  as is
the estimate of -TB.  In the case of Red and Golden Delicious apples, the combination of
tariff and TB is at least adequate to cut off trade completely. If the TB is even greater,
the prohibitive TB can be relaxed but still be sufficiently stringent to eliminate trade.
Then we differentiate equations (1) and (2) to estimate the effects of eliminating the
tariff and TB (r and  cTB)  on the value of trade:
(3)  dT  =  DD(WP/P)d(T + TTB)  - esS(WP/P)d(- +  TB)),
where  ED  and es are the price elasticities with respect to demand and supply, and the
remaining terms are as previously defined. Equation (3) requires the strong assumption
that the small-country case applies, i.e., that changes in Japanese imports would have
no impact on world prices.
Figures l(a) and l(b) illustrate the trade and welfare effects of removing the trade
barriers. Figure  l(a) represents the case when a combination  of the tariff and the TB
tariff-rate equivalent brings the price of imports up to the domestic price, P, and cuts
off trade. When only the TB is eliminated, domestic price falls to the world price plus
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Figure l(a).  Trade and welfare effects of removing TB,
with no disease or pest transmission
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Figure l(b).  Trade and welfare effects  of removing TB,
with disease or pest transmission
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the tariff, WP(1 + r). Consumers gain area {a +  b}, producers lose area a, the government
gains tariff revenue equal to d, and the net welfare gain is the area {b  + d}. Consumers
and the government gain at the expense  of producers. Transfer payments from  con-
sumers and the government could potentially compensate  producers for their loss. The
analysis is similar when both TBs and tariffs are eliminated, although in this case there
is no tariff revenue, with the net welfare gain equal to area {b + c + d + e}. These results,
however,  assume that trade poses no chance of transmission of diseases or pests and
that consumers have no concerns regarding the risk of fire blight, which might shift the
demand curve.2
If trade introduces diseases  or pests that reduce  yield, the Japanese supply curve
would rotate from S to S' [figure l(b)]. We assume a multiplicative incidence of disease,
i.e., that a fixed proportion of production is lost, regardless of production volume. In the
case  of fire  blight, the per acre production  cost increase likely would be minimal (for
example, the cost of additional tree pruning). The main impact would be a reduction in
yield during periods of severe outbreak, which would increase the cost per unit of apple
produced.  Then,  in  addition  to  the  trade  effect  of  eliminating  the  TB,  Japanese
producers would lose area {f + g + h}  due to the disease effect.  If Japanese production
declined,  both imports  and tariff revenue  {c  + d  + h}  would increase.  The  empirical
question is whether the disease effect would be so severe  as to eliminate the overall
welfare gain due to trade-that is, whether area {f + g + h} is greater than or equal to
area {b + c + d +  h}. We assume that even if fire blight is transmitted, imports still would
be allowed.  If imports were banned, consumers would get the worst of both worlds-no
trade combined with reduced domestic  production, and even higher prices than in the
original situation. If both the TB and tariff were eliminated, the disease loss off would
be compared with the net welfare gain to trade of {b  + c + d  + e}.
Since Japan has not provided a detailed risk assessment, it is not possible to estimate
the expected loss due to fire blight if the disease were transmitted.3 Such an estimate
requires  detailed information  on the probability  and consequences  of disease  intro-
duction. Although a likelihood model estimating the probability of disease transmission
was available, there was no epidemiological  study on the physical consequences of fire
blight in Japan if it were transmitted. A complete fire blight epidemiological analysis
would require investigating the impact of fire blight on other hosts, particularly pears.
A more  complete  model  also would  consider potential  losses  due to transmission  of
codling moth and apple maggot.
Instead of measuring the expected loss due to a possible disease infestation and the
resulting supply shift, we  estimate the threshold  where the loss associated with the
supply curve  shift precisely offsets the gains from trade. Some of the recent environ-
mental economics literature criticizes the use of expected utility models in cases where
the probability of outcomes cannot be determined, and advocates the use of other types
2 In this case, the TB appears to benefit only producers.  Since apples that are damaged  by fire blight would not meet
grading standards, Japanese consumers would be unconcerned about whether or not the TB is in place. The trade effects of
a TB may differ from the simple diagram if the measure affects consumers' demand for the product (Thilmany and Barrett).
For example,  a country-of-origin  label may stimulate or deter consumer demand for the foreign product.
3 Other empirical  studies have used risk assessments.  Orden and Romano consider  a range  of probabilities  of a pest
infestation and a variety of cost estimates to the U.S.  avocado industry in their study  of the U.S.-Mexican  phytosanitary
barrier dispute. Paarlberg and Lee investigate potential losses due to transmission of foot-and-mouth disease and estimate
the welfare-compensating  tariff.
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of choice models such as a minimax-type decision rule that emphasizes the most extreme
possible outcomes (Woodward and Bishop). In the case of fire blight, experts may not be
able to agree on the expected loss, yet they may be able to identify the most extreme
outcome and compare that with the estimated threshold.
Empirical Results
The Fuji variety was selected for our TB analysis since it is the most common Japanese
apple, even though Japan currently bans imports of U.S. Fuji apples on phytosanitary
grounds. The empirical model looks at the benefits and costs of reducing barriers to Fuji
trade from marketing years 1994/95 through 1996/97, assuming that fire blight affects
only Fuji production. To calculate the tariff-rate equivalent of the TB regulations, we
compare the monthly world Fuji price, WP, with the monthly national wholesale  Fuji
price in the Japanese market, P.  To approximate WP, we estimate the CIF cost (cost of
apples plus insurance and freight) of Washington Fuji apples if they could be sent to
Japan.4 We assume the Japanese wholesale price represents very high-quality apples
and compare this price with the estimated CIF price for the high end of the price range
for Washington Extra Fancy Fuji apples (Schotzko).5 We select U.S. size 72 Fuji apples-
the largest sie for which we have data-for comparison with Japanese apples because
consumers there prefer larger sizes. Transportation  costs are  assumed to be equal to
those of Red and  Golden Delicious  apples, which  are based  on data  from AMS  and
industry  estimates.  Because  we  do not have data on internal transactions  costs for
Japan, which are thought to be considerable, we understate the costs of brnging a U.S.
apple to the foreign wholesale market.6
TB Tariff-Rate Equivalents
The first two columns of table 2 show the tariff rates and TB tariff-rate equivalents for
the  1994/95-1996/97  marketing years.  Recall that since the United  States does  not
currently export Fuji apples to Japan, the TB tariff-rate equivalents represent a lower-
bound estimate. The average tariff rate over the three-year period was 19.3%, compared
with a 27.2% TB tariff-rate equivalent.  TB tariff-rate equivalents vary between years.
In a case like Japan, where there is virtually no trade, the TB we measure also could be
described as the opportunity cost to Japanese consumers of having no trade-the cost
4 We assume the Washington  State price represents  the world price because the United States is a major world apple
exporter, Washington State is the largest source of U.S. apples, and Washington State supplies Fuji apples nearly year-round
(generally October-July).
5 We use USDA's Agricultural Marketing  Service  (AMS)  data on apple prices. The first Fuji apples  of the  season are
generally exported, and AMS reports begin only when there are adequate domestic shipments  to establish a price. Also,  for
both the  1994/95 and 1995/96 seasons, AMS  data for Extra Fancy Washington Fuji apples are  available only for regular
storage apples, not controlled atmosphere apples-which means the time series ends midway through the season. To complete
the time series, we use data from the Washington Growers Clearing House Association (WGCHA) on average monthly prices
for all Fuji apples as a basis to estimate a price for Washington Extra Fancy apples during those months without AMS prices.
An average premium for the higher quality Fuji apples is estimated from the AMS and WGCHA data during the months when
both are available.  This premium is used with the average monthly WGCHA prices for all Fuji apples during the rest of the
season to obtain estimates for the higher quality Fuji.
6Even if information on internal transactions costs were available, the costs may reflect an inefficient distribution system.
Opening the market to more competition might result in efforts to streamline  the marketing structure.
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Table 2.  Short-Run Changes in Japan's  Fuji Apple Imports with Elimination
of Trade Barriers (1994/95-1996/97  marketing years)
Increase in Imports with
the Elimination  of:
TB + Ta  TB  T  Elasticity of:  TB  TB + Tariff
Tariff  TB  Tariff  -
Rate  Rate  Rate  Quantity  Value  Quantity  Value
Year  (%)  (%)  (%)  Demand  Supply  (000s MT)  ($ mil.)  (000s MT)  ($  mil.)
1994/95  19.8  51.4  71.2  -0.2  0.1  38.9  71.6  53.8  99.1
1995/96  19.3  20.6  39.9  -0.2  0.1  18.3  31.3  35.5  60.6
1996/97  18.8  9.7  28.5  -0.2  0.1  9.0  13.7  26.4  40.1
Average  19.3  27.2  46.5  -0.2  0.1  22.1  38.9  38.6  66.6
Note:  MT denotes metric tons.
facing consumers in any highly protected industry. In years when the gap between U.S.
and Japanese prices increases, the opportunity cost to Japanese consumers of foregone
consumption also increases. Therefore, the difference between P and WP could vary from
year to year as a function of world and domestic supply and demand conditions. The TB
tariff-rate equivalent for 1994/95 (51.4%) is considerably larger than that for the other
two years examined because the United States produced a record apple crop that year,
lowering U.S. apple export prices and generating a larger price gap.
Short-Run Changes in Trade from Eliminating
TB Tariff-Rate Equivalents and Tariffs
We estimate the quantity and value of trade that would have  occurred if TB require-
ments were harmonized to the current Washington State systems approach to disease
and pest management and if tariffs were eliminated.  In this case, Japan could import
apples  at  the  world  price.  We  assume  that  when  TB  tariff-rate  equivalents  are
harmonized, the standard U.S. practices are continued without any additional costs of
compliance.  To attain results, we assume a demand elasticity of -0.2  and a short-run
supply elasticity of 0.1. 7
Table  2 shows the range of annual and average  results for the short-run impact of
eliminating the TB tariff-rate  equivalent and for eliminating both the TB tariff-rate
equivalent and tariff. Here, we discuss only the results for the average of the three years
considered. If just the TB tariff-rate equivalent were removed, the average quantity of
apples imported from all sources would rise by 22,100 metric tons, up from an average
of 3,442 metric tons. If both the TB and tariff were eliminated, average imports would
rise by 38,600 metric tons, equivalent to 16%  of total 1996/97  U.S. production of Fuji
apples.
7 Cho and Cho estimate an own-price elasticity of demand for Korean apples of -0.2,  and Huang estimates a complete price
and expenditure system for specific U.S. fruits and reports a -0.2 demand elasticity. We assume the same demand elasticity
for Japan. Baumes and Conway estimate a U.S. supply elasticity at the farm level of 0.007 for fresh apples, but we assume
a slightly larger elasticity for Japan.
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Japanese  Welfare Effects from Eliminating
TB Tariff-Rate Equivalents and Tariffs
Changes in welfare for the three seasons and an average, assuming time for a long-run
adjustment,  are presented  in table  3.  The  long-run  analysis  is based  on  the  same
elasticity of demand used in the short-run analysis and a long-run constant elasticity
of supply of 1. The larger supply elasticity allows  growers to change their production
plans in response to new economic conditions.8 If just the TB were removed and there
was no possibility of disease transmission, trade would increase,  and the annual net
welfare gain for the three years would be $70.9 million, which includes a gain of $35.6
million in tariff revenue.  Producer loss would  be $210.4 million, a loss  of 31% of the
original producer welfare. In this case, imports of Fuji apples, from all sources, would
increase  by 88,200 metric tons. This increase  in imports represents  36% of U.S. Fuji
apple production in 1996/97. At this level of imports and standard Washington export
procedures for apples, the Roberts et al. model predicts an outbreak of fire blight once
in every 475 years.
Under the removal-of-TB-only  scenario, if  fire blight were transmitted, it would take
a decrease in yield of 26% to eliminate the positive gains to trade. In this case, producers
would incur a 15% decline in producer welfare solely due to the disease loss, in addition
to the 31% loss due to trade (table 3). The occurrence of a 26% annual loss, or a complete
crop loss about once every four years, is unprecedented. The very large yield loss due to
disease required to eliminate the gains to trade appears improbable.  The welfare gain
associated with the trade  effect  is much  larger than the likely loss  associated  with
transmission of the disease.
If both the  TB and  tariff were removed  and there  were  no chance  of fire blight
transmission, the net welfare gain due to trade would be $84.7 million (table 3). The net
welfare gain is only slightly larger than when just the TB is removed since there is no
longer a tariff revenue  gain. The trade effect on producer welfare is $330.3 million, a
loss of 51% of the original producer welfare. Imports would increase by 154,300 metric
tons. This  change in trade would represent  64% of the 1996/97 U.S. Fuji production.
Because  the  welfare  gains  when the  tariff is  also removed  are larger,  the  annual
yield disease loss would increase to 30% to eliminate the larger overall welfare gain due
to trade.  This level  of loss would require  a complete  loss  of production  about  once
every three years. Again,  required losses appear to be unreasonably  large compared
with experiences of other countries. Therefore, even if there were a legitimate scientific
justification for a TB, there  seems to be no economic justification for the restrictive
TB.
With our simple model, we cannot estimate potential world price increases-but we
can assess the impact of a world price increase.  If world Fuji prices increased due to
Japanese imports, producer losses, consumer gains, and net welfare gains would decline.
The required disease losses would also decrease. As the world price approaches the pre-
trade Japanese domestic price, net welfare gains would fall to zero. For example, if Fuji
prices increased 10% when the TB was eliminated, the disease loss required to eliminate
gains to trade would fall from 26% to 15%, which would imply a complete crop failure
8 Romano follows similar reasoning in his study of avocados.
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approximately once every seven years. With a 20% increase in the world Fuji price, the
required disease loss would fall to 8%.
While the increased demand for Fuji apples would account for a large percentage of
U.S. Fuji production, many countries, including the United States, are rapidly increas-
ing Fuji apple production and are anxious to supply the Japanese  market. The small-
country assumption will become more realistic with time. Between 1997 and 2005, Fuji
production by the main supplying nations, excluding China and Japan,  is predicted to
increase  43% (O'Rourke).  China, the world's largest apple  (and Fuji apple) producer,
experienced 88% growth in total apple production between 1993/94 and 1996/97 (USDA/
Foreign Agricultural  Service  1998).  The  change in trade  implied  by the removal  of
the TB and tariff would be  50%  of the estimated  1997/98  U.S.  Fuji crop,  23%  of the
estimated world crop excluding Japan and China, and 6%  of the world crop excluding
Japan but including a crude estimate of Chinese Fuji production (15% of total Chinese
apple production). Availability of other apple varieties would also dampen any increase
in Fuji prices. The increase in Fuji imports in Japan would represent  22% of 1996/97
total U.S. apple exports and about 4% of world apple exports.
Conclusions
Although the WTO  does not require a complete welfare analysis  to justify a TB, this
type of cost-benefit  analysis is critical for understanding the social welfare effects  of
regulatory policies.  Our results  show that, on average, TBs in Japan are even more
important than tariffs in deterring trade. Moreover, the primary role of Japanese TBs
for apples appears to be to protect economic rents of domestic producers from foreign
competition  and not to maximize  social  welfare.  However,  this analysis  gives equal
weight to consumer and producer welfare. When governments  choose regulatory poli-
cies, other objectives often necessitate unequal weights for different groups. There are
many similar examples of regulatory capture by producers who exert strong influence
to maintain TBs that protect economic rents. The long-standing U.S. ban on Mexican
avocados, which was only partially lifted in 1997, is viewed by many as another example
of regulatory capture (Romano).
While measuring TB tariff-rate equivalents and determining the welfare impacts of
removing barriers  are  simple concepts, the empirical  application  is complex and the
results are highly dependent on a number of simplifying assumptions.  Some assump-
tions may lead to our overstating the estimates  of the TB tariff-rate  equivalent and
trade effects. We assumed that world prices are not affected by the changes in Japanese
imports. The estimated large increases in Japanese imports if barriers were eliminated,
however,  likely would  have an impact  on world prices.  This would suggest that the
Japanese price would not decline as much as indicated in our analysis, and the disease
loss required to eliminate consumer gains would be less. We may have overstated the
price differentials between Japanese and U.S. apples. To the extent that Japanese Fuji
apples are of higher quality than the top Extra Fancy Washington State Fuji apples, the
price differentials  also will reflect quality differences rather than just regulatory bar-
riers. Additionally, our price wedge calculations  did not reflect the transactions costs
of moving U.S.  apples  from the Japanese  port of entry to wholesale markets,  which
also leads to an overestimate  of the price  gap. Alternatively,  we  may underestimate
the magnitude of the TB by using the price wedge method to calculate  TB tariff-rate
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equivalents when there is no trade. The TB tariff-rate equivalents reported are lower-
bound estimates.
Other assumptions affect the welfare measures specifically.  First, of course, are the
particular  assumptions  regarding  demand and  supply specifications  and parameter
estimates. The Japanese supply curve might change when faced with new competition.
With fewer trade barriers, the Japanese apple industry would have incentives to reduce
costs which would increase producer surplus. Second, a more complete analysis would
include  potential disease losses  for codling moths and apple maggots.  And third, we
should  consider  any  changes  in Japanese  production  costs  due  to  combating  new
diseases  or pests.  Fourth, and finally, in this model the gains  to trade and required
disease losses refer only to Fuji apples. Since Fuji apples account for just over half of the
Japanese  crop, if fire blight were established in Japan, the disease loss for all apples
required to eliminate gains to Fuji trade would decline. Considering potential losses to
pears would further reduce the required  losses. Of course,  opening markets to other
types of apples and pears would provide additional consumer gains to compensate for
potential disease losses.
[Received April 1998; final revision received September 1998.]
References
Baldwin, R. E. "Measuring the Effects of Nontariff Trade-Distorting  Policies." In Trade Theory and
Economic Reform: North, South, and East, eds., J. de Melo and A. Sapir, pp. 25-42. Cambridge MA:
Basil Blackwell,  1991.
Baumes, H., and R. Conway. "An Econometric Model of the U.S. Apple Market." Staff Rep. No. AGES-
850110, USDA/Economic Research  Service, Washington DC, 1985.
Beer, S. V., J.-H. Kim, H. L. Gustafson, C. H. Zumoff, T. Momol, A. J. Bogdanove, R. J. Laby, A. Tanii,
O. Tamura, and H. S. Aldwinckle. "Characterization of Bacteria That Cause 'Bacterial Shoot Blight
of Pear' in Japan." Acta Horticulturae  411(1996):179-81.
Bigsby, H. "Quantification  of Phytosanitary Barriers to Trade." Paper presented at the meeting of the
International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, San Diego CA, 14-16 December 1997.
Cho, D. R., and J. H. Cho. "Determination Factors on Demand and Supply for Apple, Pear, and Orange."
Korea Rural  Econ. Rev.  16(1993):11-23. [Citation translated from Korean.]
Hillman, J.  "Nontariff Agricultural  Trade Barriers  Revisited." In Understanding  Technical Barriers
to Agricultural  Trade, eds., D. Orden and  D. Roberts, pp.  1-32. Conference Proceedings.  St. Paul
MN: Dept.  of Appl. Econ.,  International  Agricultural  Trade Research  Consortium, University  of
Minnesota,  1997.
Huang, K. "U.S. Demand for Food: A Complete  System of Price and Income Effects." Tech. Bull. No.
1714, USDA/Economic Research  Service, Washington DC, December  1985.
James, S., and K. Anderson. "On the Need for More Economic Assessment of Quarantine/SPS Policies."
Seminar Paper No. 98-02, Center for International Economic Studies, University of Adelaide, Aus-
tralia, February  1998.
Josling,  T. "An Analytical Framework for Assessing the Trade Impact of SPS and TBT Regulations."
Paper presented at the Economic Research Service's Technical Barriers to Trade Workshop, Wash-
ington DC, 8-9 October  1997.
Krissoff, B., L. Calvin, and D. Gray. "Barriers to Trade in Global Apple Markets." In Fruit and Tree
Nuts Situation and  Outlook, pp. 42-51. Pub. No. FTS-280, USDA/Economic Research Service, Wash-
ington DC, August 1997.
Ndayisenga, F., and J. Kinsey. "The Structure of Nontariff Trade Measures on Agricultural Products
in High-Income  Countries." Agribus.:  An Internat. J.  10(1994):275-92.
Calvin and  KrissoffJournal  of  Agricultural  and  Resource Economics
Orden, D., and E. Romano. "The Avocado Dispute and Other Technical Barriers to Agricultural Trade
Under NAFTA." Paper presented at Tri-National  Research Symposium titled  "NAFTA and Agri-
culture: Is the Experiment Working?" San Antonio TX, 1-2 November 1996.
O'Rourke, D. "World Apple Variety Outlook." Paper presented at the 41st Annual International Dwarf
Fruit Tree Association Conference, Pasco WA, 21-25 February 1998.
Paarlberg, P., and J. Lee. "Import Restrictions in the Presence of a Health Risk: An Illustration Using
FMD." Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 80(1998):175-83.
Petrey, L. A., and R. W. M. Johnson. "Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures." Rev.  Mktg. and  Agr. Econ. 61(1993):433-42.
Roberts,  D. "The WTO SPS Agreement:  Overview and Implications  for Animal  Health and Animal
Product Import Decision  Making."  Paper presented at USDA  workshop titled  "Use of Economic
Analyses in Evaluating Animal and Plant Product Import Requests," Riverdale MD, 24-25 March
1998.
Roberts, D., and K. DeRemer. "Overview of Foreign Technical  Barriers to U.S. Agricultural Exports."
ERS Staff Pap. No. 9705, USDA/Economic Research Service, Washington DC, March 1997.
Roberts, D., and D. Orden. "Determinants of Technical  Barriers to Trade: The Case  of U.S. Phyto-
sanitary  Restrictions  on  Mexican  Avocados,  1972-1995."  In  Understanding Technical Barriers
to Agricultural  Trade, eds., D. Orden and D. Roberts, pp. 117-60. Conference Proceedings. St. Paul
MN:  Dept. of Appl.  Econ.,  International Agricultural  Trade Research  Consortium, University  of
Minnesota, 1997.
Roberts, R. G., C. N. Hale, T. van der Zwet, C. E. Miller, and S. C. Redlin. "The Low Potential for Spread
of Erwinia Amylovora and Fire  Blight via Commercial Apple  Fruit: A Critical Review and Risk
Assessment." Crop Protection 17(1998):19-28.
Romano, E. "The Economic Impact of APHIS' Ban on Mexican Avocados." Unpub. Ph.D. diss., Dept. of
Agr. and Appl. Econ., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, 1998.
Scarlett, F. Assistant Manager,  Northwest Fruit Exporters, Yakima WA. Personal communication,
17 July  1997.
Schotzko, T. "Washington and Japanese Apple Grade Comparison." Good Fruit  Grower 45(December
1994):85-87.
Smith, H., and R. Lattimore. "The Search for Rules for NTBs: Fire Blight of Apples." Paper presented
at a conference of the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, San Diego CA, 14-16
December 1997.
Smith, T. J. "A Risk Assessment Model for Fire Blight of Apple and Pear."Acta  Horticulturae  411(1996):
97-104.
Sumner, D., and H. Lee. "Sanitary and Phytosanitary Trade Barriers and Empirical Trade Modeling."
In  Understanding  Technical Barriers  to Agricultural Trade, eds.,  D. Orden and D. Roberts,  pp.
273-85. Conference Proceedings. St. Paul MN: Dept. ofAppl. Econ., International Agricultural Trade
Research Consortium, University of Minnesota,  1997.
Thilmany, D., and C. Barrett. "Regulatory Barriers in an Integrating World Food Market." Rev. Agr.
Econ. 19(1997):91-107.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Fruit  and Tree Nuts: Situation and Out-
look Report, Yearbook Issue. Pub. No. FTS-281, USDA/ERS, Washington DC, October  1997.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural  Service. "Fresh Deciduous Fruit." Annual data
[Japan], Attache Report, USDA/FAS, Tokyo, Japan, 1996.
."Fresh Deciduous Fruit." Annual data [Japan], Attache Report, USDA/FAS, Tokyo, Japan, 1997.
.World Horticultural  Trade and U.S. Export Opportunities,  pp. 16-25. Pub. No. FHORT 03-98,
USDA/FAS, Washington DC, March  1998.
van der Zwet, T. "Present World-Wide Distribution of Fire Blight." Acta Horticulturae  411(1996):7-8.
van der Zwet, T., and S. V. Beer. "Fire Blight-Its Nature, Prevention, and Control: A Practical Guide
to Integrated Disease Management." Agr. Info. Bull. No. 631, USDA/Agricultural Research Service,
Washington DC, July  1995.
van der Zwet, T., and H. L. Keil. Fire  Blight-A Bacterial  Disease  of Rosaceous Plants. Agr. Handbook
No. 510, USDA/Agricultural Research  Service, Washington DC, 1979.
Woodward, R. T., and R. C. Bishop. "How to Decide When Experts Disagree: Uncertainty-Based  Choice
Rules in Environmental  Policy." Land Econ. 73(1997):492-507.
366  December 1998